Scientism recognizes evidence only of the quantitative/general variety by Kowalski, Charles J. et al.
OR I G I N A L P A P E R
Scientism recognizes evidence only of the quantitative/general
variety
Charles J. Kowalski Ph.D1 | Adam J. Mrdjenovich Ph.D2 | Richard W. Redman Ph.D3
1Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences
Institutional Review Board, The University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
2Office of Research, The University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
3School of Nursing, The University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Correspondence
Charles J. Kowalski, Health Sciences and
Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review
Board, University of Michigan, North Campus
Research Complex, 2800 Plymouth Road,




Rationale, aims and objectives: McHugh and Walker introduced a model of knowl-
edge to demonstrate that EBM is a form of scientism that ignores important sources
of knowledge thereby impairing the practice of medicine. We study the development
of this model and explore additional applications.
Methods: Review of the relevant literature and identification of possible areas for
fruitful application.
Results: We show that the McHugh and Walker model is closely related to the model
of evidence considered earlier by Upshur et al. We also indicate that the utility of this
model is not limited to showing scientism distorts clinical practice. Several represen-
tative applications are identified, including psychotherapy, the Salk polio vaccine trial,
and the placebo effect.
Conclusions: Priority should be given to Upshur et al for the development of a model
that has far-reaching application to medical epistemology. It is shown that all four of
the types of evidence considered—qualitative/personal, qualitative/general, quantita-
tive/general, and quantitative/personal—are required to adequately characterize
epistemology in medical research and practice.
K E YWORD S
EBM, efficacy and effectiveness, horses for courses, quantomania, tacit knowledge
1 | INTRODUCTION
A recent paper in Bioethical Inquiry1 makes the interesting and impor-
tant point that the intrusion of scientism (read EBM) into clinical prac-
tice distorts “clinical reality” by ignoring tacit knowledge and thus
impairs medical practice. They base their argument on the view that
knowledge can be described along two intersecting “dimensions,” the
tacit-explicit and the particular-general.
The tacit-explicit dimension of knowledge represents the varying
degrees to which knowledge can be articulated. Explicit knowledge is
that which can be easily articulated, for example, current systolic BP
of 149; tacit knowledge cannot be easily (if at all) articulated, for
example, how to identify and characterize heart murmurs. Tacit
knowledge was first characterized by Polyani,2 and its importance in
clinical medicine has been recognized by many, see for example,
Henry3,4 and the references he provides.
The particular-general dimension refers to the degree of applica-
bility of the knowledge: knowledge is “general” to the extent that it
can be applied to a group of some kind; it is “particular” to the extent
that it is specific to a single individual/thing.
The four kinds of knowledge considered by McHugh and Walker
can then be set out as shown in Figure 1 (hereafter referred to as the
MW model).
They argue that all four types of knowledge are needed in medi-
cine, and that this scheme “allows us to recognize the different roles
and grounding that medical knowledge can have, without presuming
any one to be superior or inferior to others” (p. 585). This stands in
sharp contrast to the EBM paradigm that focuses exclusively on Q3
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evidence (eg, Hutchinson and Rogers5). Also see Bluhm6 who argued
that the idea of a hierarchy of evidence (which she points out is really a
hierarchy ofmethodology) should be replaced by a “network”model that
takes into account the relationship between evidence drawn from vari-
ous sources, or types of studies, that is, choose whatever combination
of Q1-Q4 evidence is appropriate to the question in hand.
This more inclusive view of knowledge promises to be useful in a
variety of contexts. The one detailed by McHugh and Walker is based
on the recognition that scientism (EBM) excludes tacit and particular
knowledge (Q1 and Q2), thereby distorting clinical reality and
impairing medical practice. As stated by them,
Medicine has been informed by scientific principles
throughout its history. However, perhaps partly
because of the success of modern medical science, sci-
entific knowledge is often elevated above other forms
of knowledge, such that it might be expected that all
medical knowledge should be scientifically justified.
This expectation is reinforced by the widespread adop-
tion of ‘evidence based medicine’ … whereby the idea
of ‘best practice’ is governed primarily by the results of
scientific research (pp. 583-4).
We agree, and are confident that most readers of the Journal of
Evaluation in Clinical Practice share this sentiment. However, we think
that it is important to recognize that the scheme set out in Figure 1 is
closely related to one developed by Upshur et al (2001)7 (hereafter,
the UVG model), and we want to emphasize the fact that the utility of
this formulation is not limited to demonstrations of scientism. Thus,
we go beyond recognizing Upshur et al's priority to indicating other
contexts within which their model can be used to illuminate matters.
We begin by detailing the UVG model of evidence.
2 | THE MODEL OF EVIDENCE IN HEALTH
CARE PROPOSED BY UPSHUR ET AL (2001)
This model incorporates the four distinct but related types of evi-
dence: qualitative/personal, qualitative/general, quantitative/general,
and quantitative/personal. The model can be depicted as in Figure 2.
Slightly different descriptors are attached to the dimensions by
McHugh and Walker, but the apparent differences between the
models shown in Table 1 are more stylistic, than substantive. One
need only identify qualitative with tacit; personal with particular;
and quantitative with explicit. Upshur et al give examples of each of
the four types of evidence included in their scheme. Qualitative/
personal (Q1) evidence includes that pertaining to the beliefs, atti-
tudes, preferences, and perceptions of both the health care provider
and the patient as obtained, for example, from case histories, clinical
encounters, and interviews. Qualitative/general (Q2) evidence is pri-
marily social and historical and might result from policy studies, or
consensus methods like Delphi group approaches. This quadrant is
necessary to capture the cultural, social, and gender dimensions of
evidence. Thus, whether we think of personal views and preferences,
or social views and preferences, we are clearly dealing with tacit
knowledge.
The quantitative/personal (Q4) is typified by quality of life (QoL)
scales; the quantitative/general (Q3) by the kinds of evidence avail-
able from EBM, in particular from the RCT. The knowledge to be
gained from these sources of evidence is clearly of the explicit kind in
that it is generally numerical and therefore easy to articulate.
A more important difference needs some unpacking: Upshur
speaks of “evidence,” McHugh of “knowledge.” It is possible to see
the two as but opposite sides of the same coin: knowledge is justi-
fied belief, and one's belief is justified to the extent that s/he has
good (relevant) evidence to support it. According to this view, the
UVG model is essentially equivalent to the MW model in that
UVG evidence leads to MW knowledge. As an example, a person's
QoL is explicit/particular knowledge based on quantitative/personal
evidence.
Alternatively, and better, the two models can be kept separate,
and viewed as complementary to one another. In this formulation,
UVG evidence would lead to MW knowledge only if it were both reli-
able and relevant to the problem in hand. This has the advantage that
it emphasizes that context modifies the relevance of evidence (good
evidence is not always relevant) and the complementary model
F IGURE 1 McHugh and Walker's four kinds of knowledge
F IGURE 2 Upshur et al's four kinds of evidence
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highlights this relationship as inherent to medical research and prac-
tice. This view also facilitates an appreciation of the case studies con-
sidered below. In any case, we denote by the UVGMW model the
melding of the UVG and MW models. They are seen as both bringing
something to the table, ingredients that are complementary (not com-
peting!) to one another. This model is used in the following examples
to illustrate the point that all four quadrants of the model are required
to adequately address the questions posed.
3 | OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
3.1 | The research/practice distinction
The Belmont Report (National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research)8 draws a
sharp distinction between clinical practice and research, stating:
It is important to distinguish between biomedical
and behavioral research, on the one hand, and
the practice of accepted therapy on the other…For
the most part, the term “practice” refers to inter-
ventions that are designed solely to enhance the
well-being of an individual patient or client and
that have a reasonable expectation of success…By
contrast, the term “research” denotes an activity
designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions
to be drawn, and thereby contribute to generaliz-
able knowledge. (p. 3)
Kowalski et al9 have argued that this purported separation does
more harm than good along a number of fronts. Of most interest here
is that, often, the implication is that the “evidence” that can be gained
from clinical practice is not really evidence at all, and that only evi-
dence arising in research contexts counts. Otherwise stated, only Q3
evidence is real evidence, and the other quadrants have no role to play
in making healthcare decisions. As noted by Bluhm and Borgerson10
“The idea that research is a systematic activity that aims to produce
generalizable knowledge implies that the contrast class—clinical care—
is not systematic and does not lead to new knowledge” (p. 476). The
UVGMW model, however, includes other forms of evidence that have
been shown to assume important roles in clinical practice. Consider,
for example, that a patient, P, with disease D cannot be replaced by D
alone (P 6¼ D). If we concentrate on quantitative/general evidence
(EBM) to the exclusion of other types of evidence, we may achieve
good management of the disease, but a less than satisfactory outcome
for the patient.
3.2 | Reuniting MDs and nurses
One of the unintended side effects of the ascension of scientism/
EBM has been the estrangement of the medical and nursing profes-
sions. Medicine is increasingly seen solely in terms of the diagnosis
and treatment of disease. Focus on the patient is replaced by a con-
sideration of that patient's disease, focusing in on the particular dis-
ease mechanism causing signs and symptoms in a patient and then,
based on the diagnosis, treating that disease using scientific principles
and best (Q3) evidence available. Nursing, on the other hand, has a
much broader holistic approach, examining the impact of a diagnosis
and its treatment on a patient in the context of their lives (Q2) and
values (Q1 and Q4).
Consider, for example, a patient newly diagnosed with a type of
cancer. With confirmation of the diagnosis, a physician would next
focus on the best way to treat the specific cancer cells, given the
stage and extent of the malignancy. The treatment plan would be
based on the best evidence available (EBM), balancing the expected
effects of some combination of chemotherapy, radiation, gene ther-
apy, or surgery with the anticipated response of the malignancy to that
therapeutic plan. A nurse would likely focus on the patient's response
to this new diagnosis, the impact of the diagnosis on the patient's
roles, responsibilities, values, and desired quality of life. Part of the
nurse's plan will typically include helping the patient manage the signs,
symptoms and effects of the treatment.
It seems clear that these approaches, implemented collabora-
tively, would best support the patient in obtaining optimal outcomes in
accordance with patient values and preferences. While the general ori-
entation of the two approaches is distinguishable, they are in no way
competitors—they are best viewed as mutually supportive. Indeed,
MD/nurse collaboration is generally recognized as the preferred
method for obtaining optimal clinical outcomes,11 the separation
reflecting more of a convenient “division of labor,” than independent
spheres of activity. We suggest that an even more efficacious assign-
ment of roles and responsibilities will result by refusing to recognize
the separation in the first place. After all, the beginnings of separation
begin at the beginning, ingrained in the professional schools' curricula.
One of the challenges for both medicine and nursing is keeping cur-
rent with the changing evidence base that supports clinical practice.
Studies typically report that many clinicians in both disciplines tend to
practice in accordance with how they were trained, that is, basing
interventions on the evidence available at the time of their clinical
education. While evidence changes over time, clinicians often con-
tinue to practice based on their original training (esp. the emphasis
given to basic science courses in the medical school curriculum12)
and experience without changing their interventions to reflect
the revisions and changes in evidence as a result of research. Thus,
TABLE 1 Comparison of Upshur et al's evidence types with
McHugh and Walker's kinds of knowledge
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considerable variation exists in many clinical settings with actual care
delivered sometimes not in accordance with the best evidence
available.
3.3 | Evidence and ways of knowing in
psychotherapy
In psychotherapy, tacit knowledge (Q1 and Q2) step to the forefront,
and these are considered in turn below:
Q1, intuition, and creativity. Q1 evidence in the form of “intuitive
knowing” is integral to the practice of (good) psychotherapy. Over the
past several decades, psychotherapy has become much more formal-
ized in an effort to provide the standardization necessary for research
purposes.13 This trend has contributed to the misconception that psy-
chotherapy can be delivered with a high degree of precision or speci-
ficity (eg, saying the “right thing” to a particular client about a
particular problem) when, in practice, psychotherapy is a fundamen-
tally intuitive, creative exercise. A therapist's ability to be creative
comes from tacit, experiential knowledge that is nonconceptual and
sometimes ineffable.14,15 Such knowledge cannot be acquired by
reading alone.
In contrast to a set of facts that can be examined objectively, evi-
dence in psychotherapy consists of a constructed narrative known as
the client's “story.” Therapists must proceed based on their intuitive
recognition of what is “going on” with clients. Good therapists listen
with attention to any “funny feelings” that something might be amiss.
By asking questions, offering interpretations, or suggesting actions,
they attempt to articulate and explore their intuition with respect to
the client's perception of what is going on. Because strategies and
interventions that work for one client may not work for others, the
process calls for improvisation and constant refinement based on
information that is perceived tacitly and used creatively.14 Much of
this occurs semi-consciously, which is to say that therapeutic encoun-
ters are often marked by vague hints, incomplete thoughts, and
sudden realizations that “hit you” without deliberate analysis. Interest-
ingly, when things are going smoothly, one can function effectively
as a therapist—perhaps even more effectively—by not overthinking
things. In this way, Bohart14 characterized psychotherapy as an artistic
endeavor.
Q2, practical knowledge, and rules of thumb. After practicing for a
number of years, one learns that psychotherapy does not actually
work the way it was presented in graduate school. As opposed to the
hypothetico-deductive method whereby one might test hypotheses
derived from structured observations of behavior, psychotherapy is
not always coherent or logical, nor is it based on probabilities. For
these reasons, and out of sheer necessity, therapists must operate
from a tacit framework of knowledge or evidence that guides their
decision-making almost automatically, based on their accumulated
experience as clinicians.16,17
Psychotherapy is a practice-focused activity by nature, and thus it
requires a great deal of practical knowledge in the form of heuristics
(ie, general sets of principles, outlines, or guides that can be used as
mental shortcuts).16-19 For example, “rules of thumb” exist for the
assessment of risk (eg, the likelihood that clients may harm them-
selves or others), and for making rough assessments of how serious a
client's condition is before conducting a lengthy diagnostic interview
or psychological testing that may not be necessary. Psychotherapy is
really a stepwise process of narrowing down clients' problems, and
gaining an awareness of how they understand and interact with those
problems. Initially, this is done with the goal of categorizing or gener-
alizing the presenting problem into a diagnosis. Given the nuances of
making an accurate diagnosis, and the dynamic and often ambiguous
nature of psychotherapy (not to mention the complexity of human
behavior), it is critical for therapists to simplify their work through the
use of heuristics so they can make immediate judgments about how
to proceed, and modify their approach as necessary.
3.4 | Understanding why nothing works
In this subsection we briefly consider the placebo effect. There is a
voluminous literature devoted to this topic, and it is not our intention
to confront this. Rather, we assume that the effect exists (a Q3 ques-
tion) and point out that any attempt to understand just why this is so
will necessarily involve all of the Qs. Consider, for example, pain
reduction (Q4) by acupuncture. An individual's response to acupunc-
ture will necessarily involve that person's attitudes and preferences
(Q1) which will be shaped to some extent by societal viewpoints (Q2),
as well as properties of the encounter between the patient and acu-
puncturist (Q1PxQ1A). It may also have neurobiological and/or
genetic (the “placebome”) connections (Q3). A good, up-to-date sum-
mary is given by Greenberg20 who may be consulted for the following
quotes which we offer as food for thought: “[The] placebo effect is a
biological response to an act of caring; that somehow the encounter
itself calls forth healing and that the more intense and focused it is,
the more healing it evokes” (p. 55) … and, “Once you start measuring
the placebo effect in a quantitative way, you're transforming it to be
something other than what it is” (p. 56).
3.5 | The Salk polio vaccine trial
We have previously21 made the point that large-scale public health
interventions often require evidence beyond simple efficacy, the limit
of what an RCT can provide. We aim for effectiveness, not efficacy
and will favor pragmatic, not explanatory trials.22
One such summary of the sorts of evidence required is the RE-
AIM set of criteria, as discussed in Kowalski and Mrdjenovich.21,23
The RE and AIM pieces are both part of the same study, but RE differs
from AIM in that RE refers to the results available at the study's con-
clusion, whereas AIM refers to what happens after the study proper
has been concluded. RE focuses on efficacy; AIM has to do with effec-
tiveness. The ingredients of the RE-AIM casserole are discussed in
turn below. Each is introduced by asking a question relevant to the
Salk trial.
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R: Reach. In terms of the Salk trial, R asks the question of whether
those agreeing to participate will adequately represent the target pop-
ulation. Reach is an individual-level measure of participation referring
to the percentage (Q4) and characteristics (Q1) of persons included in
the study.
E: Efficacy. Does the Salk vaccine work? Efficacy outcomes
should include both positive and negative measures; and behavioral,
quality of life (Q4), and participant satisfaction (Q1) outcomes, as well
as physiologic endpoints (Q3).
A: Adoption. If the Salk vaccine is shown to be effective, will it
actually be used by the target population?
I: Implementation. If the Salk vaccine is shown to be effective,
can it be delivered as intended to the entire target population?
M: Maintenance. If the Salk vaccine is shown to be effective, will
it remain so when delivered to the (much larger) target population?
Each of the AIM components involves Q2 evidence/knowledge.
For example, Adoption clearly depends on general societal attitudes
concerning vaccination. Other such attitudes that come immediately
to mind include feelings about abortion, blood transfusions, euthana-
sia, Obamacare, and socialized medicine. Imagine the differences in
testing smoking cessation programs in the 1950s (when large num-
bers smoked, and few wanted to stop) and currently (when relatively
few smoke, but those that do and want to stop are likely to be highly
motivated). Implementation and maintenance are more practical
matters, for example, are any changes in delivery necessary given
that the intervention will be given to large numbers of people? Can
quality control measures appropriate for trial execution (sufficient
for the smaller sample) be generalized to cover the target popula-
tion? Such questions cannot be answered by only looking at Q3 evi-
dence; and were in fact problematic in the Salk trial. Not all of the
vaccines manufactured immediately after the announcement of the
vaccine's success met minimal safety and potency standards. For
example, some lots of the vaccine produced by the Cutter and
Wyeth pharmaceutical company were insufficiently inactivated lead-
ing to live polio virus in more than 100 000 doses and causing paral-
ysis and death in a number of children. This is a clear example of the
serious harm that can occur when the RE-AIM criteria focus on the E
to the exclusion of the M component. Scientism can be dangerous to
your health.
3.6 | Antidote to quantomania
McHugh and Walker1 have convincingly argued that limiting consider-
ation to only explicit/general forms of knowledge (as done in EBM)
distorts clinical reality and thereby impairs medical practice. The insis-
tence that knowledge be “scientific,” “objective,” “numerical” has been
called quantomania, a stance characterized by “What can't be coun-
ted, simply doesn't count.” It is worth pointing out that quantomania
can and does distort other forms on inquiry, not only that of clinical
medicine. Muller24 has detailed how “metric fixation” can have delete-
rious consequences in such diverse areas as the military, business and
finance, and philanthropy and foreign aid.
To say that numbers should not play an exclusive role in clinical
decision making is, of course, far from saying that they should play
no role. Quantification will often prove an insightful maneuver. Its
proper role depends on context. Our final thought is nicely summa-
rized in a recent book by Hans Rosling, Factfulness.25 Bill Gates
has been quoted as saying that this is “One of the most important
books I've ever read—an indispensable guide to thinking about the
world.”
There are indeed a number of important guides to thinking
included in the book; one that gets repeated mention, in a number
of contexts, is the idea that “The world cannot be understood with-
out numbers. But the world cannot be understood by numbers
alone.”
From Rosling (p. 201):
The world cannot be understood without numbers, nor
through numbers alone. A country cannot function
without a government, but the government cannot
solve every problem. Neither the public sector nor the
private sector is always the answer. No single measure
of a good society can drive every aspect of its develop-
ment. It's not either/or. It's both and it's case by case.
Context matters. The “case-by-case” limitation imposed by
Rosling is another way of saying “Horses for courses,” that it's wise to
bet on the competing alterative that best matches the task in hand.
4 | CONCLUSIONS
We have in all of our work, emphasized the importance of “horses for
courses,” that is, that one should choose the best tool for the job in
hand. Context matters. The UVGMW model is especially useful in this
regard in that it that it shows how context modifies the relevance of
evidence. In particular, it allows us to match the design of a study to
the kind(s) of evidence required to answer the question in hand. Good
evidence is not always relevant.
The total UVGMW model is meant to be general—to encompass
all of medical epistemology. Asking a question may limit interest to
one or another, or several, of the quadrants. Some questions will
require that all four be considered. We believe that seldom, if ever,
will Q3 alone (scientism) be up to the task, and this has been illus-
trated in several particular cases above. Matching the Qs to the ques-
tion asked is part of the art of research (as is asking a good question
to begin with). There is no model for this … In the vernacular, “There
is no app for that.”
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